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Abstract  
Using panel estimates and Stochastic Frontier Analysis this paper aims to contribute to 
the analysis of bank efficiency of the European banks in the aftermath of the international 
financial crisis and the sovereign crisis that seriously affected many EU countries. It also 
considers hypothetical scenarios of exit from the EU of some of the particularly relevant 
member-states, including the Brexit scenario. The results obtained very clearly 
demonstrate the existence of statistically significant technical inefficiencies in all 
considered scenarios. Nevertheless, the results reveal that the exclusion of the Italian 
banks and of the UK banks from our estimates would be more beneficial to the decrease 
of the banks’ cost inefficiencies than the exclusion of the French and the German banks. 
Moreover, the worst scenario in terms of the decrease of the EU banks’ cost inefficiencies 
would be the exclusion of the banks from the five EU countries that were deeply affected 
by the international financial and sovereign crises and were obliged to restructure their 
bank systems, that is, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
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1. Introduction  
Banks are in general supposed to manage risks and to help solving potential adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems caused by imperfect information between borrowers and lenders. 
However, banks also have incentives to maximize high-valued investment opportunities, and 
sometimes they don’t prevent risks and contribute to financial distresses and insolvencies that can 
lead to financial crisis. 
During the last decades the banking institutions have been exposed to new challenges, such as 
increased liberalisation, deregulation, technological changes and internationalisation. The 
challenges were particularly evident in the European Union (EU) after the implementation of the 
Single Market Programme and the introduction of the single currency that were supposed to 
remove barriers, increasing competition and contributing to bank efficiency. 
In recent years the EU banking institutions have been experiencing the phenomena related to the 
European integration as well as the consequences of the strong turbulences caused by the 
international financial crisis that started in the United States. Some EU countries had to face not 
only financial imbalances but also imbalances in their public budgets and were obliged to request 
international financial assistance to overcome the financial and sovereign crises. 
Nowadays, the EU is overcoming these crises but, at the same time, it is experiencing new 
challenges, namely those related to the possibility of the exit of one member-state, the UK, which 
is particularly relevant in terms of the EU financial and banking systems.  
In this context, two main questions are addressed in this study: 
1) How efficient revealed to be the EU banks in the aftermath of the international financial 
crisis? Aiming to answer to this question we apply Stochastic Frontier Analysis to a panel 
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including a relatively high sample of banks from all EU countries for the period 2011-
2017. 
2) How would the EU banks perform in the hypothesis of exit from the EU of some 
particularly relevant member-states, including the scenario of the Brexit? To answer to 
this question, we consider some hypothetical scenarios, represented by six specific 
panels: besides the panel including the banks from all current EU countries, four panels 
considering the exclusion of the banks from some financially relevant countries: France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK. The sixth panel excludes the banks from 5 EU countries that 
were mostly affected by the financial and sovereign crises and were obliged to request 
international financial assistance (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). 
 
The results obtained reveal the existence of statistically significant technical inefficiencies in all 
panels. Moreover, in our sample of EU banks, there is no clear correspondence between the 
relevance of each of the considered sub-samples in terms of the number of included banks and 
the provided loans in 2017 and the results regarding bank cost inefficiency. The results also reveal 
that, in general, the exclusion of the Italian banks or of the UK banks would be more beneficial 
to the variation of the banks’ cost inefficiencies than the exclusion of the French or German banks. 
The worst scenario would be the exclusion of the 5 EU countries that were deeply affected by the 
international financial and the sovereign crises and were obliged to restructure their bank systems 
(Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature review; the methodology 








2. Brief literature review  
The concept of efficiency, including bank efficiency, have been widely studied mostly since the 
pioneer contribution of Farrell (1957). In general, these studies consider the possibility to use the 
available data of the firms’ inputs and outputs to define the efficiency frontier as the best 
combination of these inputs and outputs, and then measuring the firms’ efficiency with the 
deviations from the efficiency frontier. 
Bank efficiency has been analysed with non-parametric approaches, namely with the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) that was first developed by Charnes et al. (1978) and since then 
has been extensively used.  
Recent examples of the use of DEA techniques to analyse the efficiency of the European banks 
are to be found, for example, in Tuskan and Stojanovic (2016) and in Kocisova (2017).  Tuskan 
and Stojanovic (2016) study the efficiency of the banking industry, for the period 2008–2012 on 
a sample of 28 European banking systems, suggesting that, in general, banking systems in post-
transition countries have a higher cost efficiency. Kocisova (2017) analyses revenue efficiency of 
the banking sectors in the European Union countries in 2015 and mostly concluded that the large 
banking sectors appear to be most efficient.  
Bank efficiency has also been extensively analysed with parametric methods, namely with the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), that was first proposed by Aigner et al (1977) and later 
developed by Battese and Coelli (1988, 1995).  
Several studies have used SFA to analyse the efficiency of the European banks. For example, 
Resti, A. (1997) use both SFA and non-parametric techniques to test the efficiency of a panel of 
270 Italian banks concluding that the efficiency of these banks did not increase over the period 
1988–1992. 
Altunbas et al (2001) using a large sample of European banks between 1989 and 1997 show that 
banks of all sizes can obtain greater cost savings if they are able to reduce managerial and other 
kind of inefficiencies.  
Bikker (2003) empirically analyses the evolution of the efficiency of the different categories of 
banks of 16 European countries during the period 1990-1997, revealing that inefficiencies in 1997 
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were nearly 45% lower than in 1990 and explaining it with the financial and monetary integration 
in the EU that increased competitive pressures and enforced European banks to operate more 
economically. 
Casu et al (2004) compare parametric and non-parametric estimates of productivity change in 
European banking between 1994 and 2000 suggesting that (where found) productivity growth has 
mainly been brought about by improvements in the performance of best practice banks.  
Bos and Schmiedel (2007) using a data set of more than 5000 large commercial banks from all 
major European banking markets over the period 1993-2004 find evidence in favour of a single 
European banking market characterized by cost and profit meta-frontiers.  
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) using the stochastic frontier approach and the distribution-free 
approach examine the cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in twelve transition economies 
of Central and Eastern Europe over the period 1993–2000 and found evidence of significant 
managerial inefficiencies. 
Delis et al (2009) estimate cost and profit stochastic frontiers based on a panel dataset of Greek 
commercial banks over the period 1993 to 2005 and found lower levels of cost efficiency than 
profit efficiency, although both measures reveal an improving trend over the sample period. 
Weill (2009) use a stochastic frontier approach to analyse the cross-country differences of bank 
cost efficiency in all EU countries between 1994 and 2005, concluding that there is an 
improvement in cost efficiency for all EU countries as well as a process of convergence in cost 
efficiency between EU countries, 
Lozano-Vivas et al (2011) use SFA and reveal the cost efficiency improvement and the 
effectiveness of merger processes and consolidations in Europe from 1998 to 2004. 
Aiello and Bonanno (2013) evaluate the cost and the profit efficiency of the Italian banking sector 
over the period 2006-2011 concluding that, in general, Italian banks perform well but there is high 
heterogeneity in the results. 
Vozková and Kuc (2017) analyse the recent trends in bank cost efficiency with SFA using data 
between 2006 and 2015 and a sample of 649 European cooperative banks, mostly showing that 
average inefficiency of European cooperative banks is increasing since 2008 and that smaller 
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cooperative banks are significantly more efficient than the bigger ones over the whole considered 
time period.  
Kuc (2018) also employs the SFA on the set of 183 cooperative banks from 12 European countries 
to investigate the size–efficiency relation of European cooperative banks during the 2006-2015 
period, showing that smaller European cooperative banks are significantly more cost efficient 
than their bigger peers.   
Oliveira (2017) analyses the efficiency of the European banks with SFA and a set of 122 
institutions representing the largest banks from a group of 15 EU member-states for the 
2000−2013 period and find that in 2013 the median European bank operated with costs 25 to 
100% above the efficient level; moreover, the paper concludes that there is ambiguous evidence 
on productivity growth, although the inefficiency of financial intermediation has been increasing 
over time, possibly driven by the least efficient banks.  
Despite the validity of all these results, it also worthwhile mentioning that authors such as Aiello 
and Bonanno (2015) documented the heterogeneity in results of banking efficiency literature. 
More precisely, they perform a meta-regression analysis examining 1661 efficiency scores 
retrieved from 120 papers published over the period 2000–2014 and conclude not only that 
parametric methods yield lower levels of banking efficiency than non-parametric studies but also 
that efficiency scores are determined by the quality of the studies, as well as the number of 




3. Methodology and data  
The analysis of bank efficiency is usually based on the assumption that the performance of the 
banks can be described by a production function linking the provided banking outputs to the 
necessary banking inputs. However, there is no clear consensus regarding the definition of the 
banking outputs and inputs.  
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The literature has identified two main approaches to analyse bank efficiency: the intermediation 
approach and the production approach. The intermediation approach considers that banks are 
mostly financial intermediaries using deposits and other borrowed funds as well as the traditional 
factors of production to provide loans and other earning assets. The production approach 
considers that banks are mostly producers of a number of financial services, including deposits, 
loans and different kinds of financial transactions, using the traditional factors of production, 
labour and capital. However, empirically, the concrete definition of the banks’ outputs and inputs 
is often restricted by the availability of the required data. 
In general, the research into efficiency, including into bank efficiency, in based on the estimation 
of an efficiency frontier with the best combinations of the different inputs and outputs of the 
production process. The deviations of the individual bank performances from the “optimal” 
frontier provide the measure of the losses of bank efficiency.  
One of the tested methods to estimate empirically the potential inefficiencies of the banks is the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), a parametric method developed among others by Aigner et 
al (1977), Battese and Coelli (1988, 1995) and Altunbas et al (2001). 
The SFA is based on a problem of economic optimisation, more precisely, the maximisation of 
profits or the minimisation of costs, given the assumption of a stochastic optimal frontier.  
Following Altunbas et al (2001) we can consider that the stochastic cost function is represented 
with the expression TC = TC (Qi, Pj)+ε, where TC is the total cost, Q is the vector of the i outputs, 
P is the vector of the prices of the j inputs and ε is the error term. 
This error term of the cost function can be decomposed into ε = u + v; where u and v are 
independently distributed. The first part of this sum, u, is assumed to be a positive disturbance, 
representing the effects of the inefficiency or the weaknesses in managerial performance. This 
part is also supposed to be distributed as half-normal as well as truncated at zero, [𝑢~𝑁+(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2)], 
with non-zero μ mean, as each unit´s production must lie on or below its production frontier, but 
above zero. The second part of the error, v, represents the random disturbances and is assumed to 




Since the estimation of the cost function provides only the value of the error term, ε, we need to 
find a way to estimate the value of the inefficiency part, u. Following Jondrow et al (1982) and 
Greene (1990) we can decompose the total variance into 𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
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        represents the relative contribution of the inefficiency term.  Moreover, the variability 









where 0 ≤  ≤ 1. Therefore, if  is close to zero the deviations of the costs will be mostly due to 
statistical noise; and if  is close to one, the deviations will be mostly related to the existence of 
technical inefficiencies. 
This possibility to differentiate the statistical noises (v) from the inefficiency deviations (u) is one 
of the recognised advantages of the SFA. Another important advantage of this method is that it is 
not sensitive to outliers, meaning that, if we include in our estimations a variable that is not clearly 
relevant, this variable will have a very low weighting in the measure of the efficiency scores, and 
the impact of this non-relevant variable will be considered as negligible. 
Despite the lack of consensus regarding the precise definition of the banking outputs and inputs, 
there is a general view considering that banks attract deposits and other funds and, using labour 
and other types of inputs such as buildings, equipment and technology, they transform the funds 
into loans and other assets or securities.  
The data used in this paper are sourced from the Moody’s Analytics BankFocus database that has 
the advantage of combining the well-known data content of the Bureau van Dijk and the Moody’s 
Investors Services with the expertise from Moody’s Analytics. Despite the comprehensive 
information provided by this database we still had to deal with the lack of information for some 
of the considered years and/or indicators for the universe of the European banks and this restricted 
our choices in terms of the banks included in our sample as well as the definition of the banks’ 
outputs and inputs. 
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We will follow the intermediation approach and we will use the natural logarithms of the chosen 
variables to estimate a function considering the Total Cost (defined as the sum of the interest 
expenses and the non-interest expenses) as the dependent variable. We will consider two models, 
one including three outputs: Total Loans, Other Earning Assets and Non-Earning Assets (Model 
1) and another model only including Total Loans and Other Earning Assets as outputs (Model 2).  
In both models we will consider two inputs: the price of the borrowed funds (defined as the ratio 
of the Interest Expenses to the Deposits and Short-Term Funding) and the price of capital and 
labour (proxied by the ratio of the Non-Interest Expenses to the Total Assets).  
In our models we will also include some other control variables that are supposed to represent 
banks’ performance and to influence banks’ cost: the ratio of Bank Equity to Total Assets, the 
ratio of Off-Balance Sheet Items to Total Assets, the ratio of Non-Performing Loans to Gross 
Loans, and the ratio of Profit Before Tax to Average Assets. The ratio of Equity to Total Assets 
is included as a proxy for leverage, representing the risk preferences across banking institutions 
(see, among others, Bikker et al, 2012; Apergis and Alevizopoulou, 2011; Apergis, 2015). The 
inclusion of the ratio Off-Balance Sheet Items to Total Assets and Non-Performing Loans to 
Gross Loans takes into consideration the non-traditional bank activities and the risks inherent to 
banking operations (following, authors such as Chiu et al., 2011; Guarda et al., 2013; 
Mamatzakis, 2015; Hughes and Moon, 2018). Several recent papers opt to include the Non-
Performing Loans as undesired output when estimating their efficiency frontiers (for instance, 
Matthews, 2010; Maggi, 2016; Boussemart et al., 2017; Colesnic et al., 2018).  
In our estimations we also include the ratio Profit Before Tax to Average Assets as a control 
variable, aiming to analyse the influence of banks’ profitability (extensively discussed, for 
example, in Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Kok et al., 2015; 
Martinho et al., 2017). 
As we want not only to measure the efficiency of the EU banking sector but also to analyse the 
effects of the eventual exit of some relevant countries, in our estimates we will consider six panels. 
First, we include the whole sample of the banks from all current EU member-states. Then we 
consider 4 panels, each of them excluding the banks of 4 relevant EU countries: France, Germany, 
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Italy and the UK. Finally, we consider a panel excluding the banks of the five countries that were 
deeply affected by the international financial and sovereign crisis, countries that had to overcome 
very challenging problems, some of them related to the performance of their banking institutions:  
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
Table 1 presents the six balanced panels used in our estimates, mostly restricted by the available 
data in the Moody’s Analytics BankFocus database over the period from 2011 to 2017. The 
presented information documents the relevance of the banks of the countries excluded from the 
whole sample in each of our sub-samples in terms of the percentage of the total banks as well as 
the percentage of the loans provided in 2017. According to this information, for example, the UK 
banks represent 8% of the banks included in our sample but in 2017 provided more than 22% of 
the loans provided by our whole sample of EU banks.  On the other side, the Italian banks 
represent almost 22% of the banks included in the whole sample but in 2017 they provided only 
9% of the loans provided by all the considered banks from the 28 EU countries (the number of 
banks by each of the EU member-states and their representativeness in our sample are presented 
in Annex I). 
 
Table 1 - Composition and relevance of the six panels considered in the estimations 
 Composition Number of 
banks 
% of the 
total banks 
% of the provided 
loans in 2017 
Panel 1 Banks from all EU countries 485 100 100 
Panel 2 Without French banks 441 91.13 77.31 
Panel 3 Without German banks 382 78.76 89.83 
Panel 4 Without Italian banks 380 78.35 91.04 
Panel 5 Without UK banks 447 91.96 77.84 
Panel 6 Without banks from 5 EU countries*  453 93.4 88.45 




4. Results obtained  
Table 2 summarises the results obtained with panel Stochastic Frontier estimates in the two 
models and the six considered panels (see Annex II for detailed information about the results 
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obtained with SFA). According to Table 2, the results obtained for the Wald tests and the log of 
the likelihood allow us to conclude that, in both models, the specified cost functions fit the data 
well and, in all situations, the null hypothesis that there is no inefficiency is rejected.  
The robustness of the results obtained with Model 1 (including as outputs the Loans, the Other 
Earning Assets and the Non-Earning Assets) is fully confirmed with Model 2 (excluding the Non-
Earning Assets from the outputs). 
Not surprisingly, in all situations, the elasticity of the cost relative to each of the considered 
outputs is positive, meaning that an increase in the production results contributes to the growth of 
the costs. Moreover, and as expected, the higher are the costs of the considered production inputs 
(that is, the price of the borrowed funds and the price of capital and labour) the higher will also 
be the Total Cost.  
 
 
Table 2 - Summary of the results obtained with panel Stochastic Frontier estimates (*) 
PANELS(**) PANEL 1 PANEL 2 PANEL 3 PANEL 4 PANEL 5 PANEL 6 















































































































































































































































             
Wald chi2 22298.7 11051.2 19954.3 11079.6 21165.2 10338.5 19224.3 11995.7 22382.0 14604.7 18278.0 9305.8 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
























N 3395 3395 3087 3087 2674 2674 2660 2660 3129 3129 3171 3171 
(*) Dependent variable: Total Cost 
(**) Panel 1: Banks from all EU countries; Panel 2: Without France; Panel 3: Without Germany; Panel 4: Without Italy; 





In what regards to the control variables, the results presented in Table 2 indicate that the elasticity 
of the Total Cost relative to the ratio of the Non-Performing Loans to the Gross Loans is always 
positive, meaning that the effect in the Total Cost of the performing and non-performing loans is 
similar, although not with the same statistical significance (as presented in this Table 2 and more 
clearly documented in Annex II).  In addition, the growth of the ratio of the Profit before Tax to 
the Average Assets is always statistically significant and in line with the growth of the Total Cost. 
On the other side, the elasticity of the Total Cost relative to the ratio Equity to Total Assets and 
to the ratio Off-Balance Sheet to Total Assets is always negative and statistically significant, 
revealing that the Total Cost does not increase with the growth of the banks’ Equity nor with the 
banks’ activities that are not included in the banks’ Balance Sheets. 
 
Table 3 presents the values of the mean, , of the first part of the cost function’s error that capture 
the effects of inefficiency. The results obtained reveal the existence of technical inefficiencies 
and that they are almost always statistically significant, more evidently in Model 2, where we 
only consider two outputs: Loans and Other Earning Assets.  
 
 
Table 3 – Values of the mean of first part of the cost’s function error () 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Panel(*)  Coefficient z P>|z|  Coefficient z P>|z| 
Panel 1 1.301111    .5368358      2.42    0.015 .734889    .0809352      9.08    0.000   
Panel 2 1.339288    .8593715      1.56    0.119 .7984115    .0745503     10.71    0.000 
Panel 3 1.2525     .740603        1.69 0.091 .7738093    .0737387     10.49    0.000 
Panel 4 1.675875    4.220013      0.40    0.691 1.981322    5.082113         0.39 0.697 
Panel 5 1.839847    6.166049      0.30    0.765 2.006634    6.466169      0.31    0.756 
Panel 6 1.273452    .3939569      3.23    0.001 .7554726    .0793658      9.52    0.000 
(*)Panel 1: Banks from all EU countries; Panel 2: Without France; Panel 3: Without Germany; Panel 4: Without Italy;  




The existence of inefficiencies is confirmed in Table 4 by the very high (all between 0.8 and 0.9) 





2  ), which represent the contribution 
of the inefficiency term (u) to the total error.  
The results obtained clearly demonstrate that the inefficiencies are still higher in Model 2, 
revealing that the consideration of three outputs (Loans, Other Earning Assets and Non-Earning 
Assets) in Model 1 decreases the relevance of the bank cost inefficiency term in the total error.  
Furthermore, a careful analysis of the gamma () values, presented in Table 4, shows that in both 
models the inefficiency error terms are lower in Panel 4 and higher in Panel 6. These results reveal 
that the exclusion of the Italian banks (our Panel 4) looks like being more beneficial to the banks’ 
cost efficiency; and the worse scenario for banks’ efficiency is represented by Panel 6, that is, the 
exclusion of the banks of the 5 EU countries that were deeply affected by the international 
financial and the sovereign crises and were obliged to restructure their bank systems (Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). 
 
Table 4 – Summary of the values of the contribution of the inefficient error term to total 
variance () 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 




Panel 1 .8149317    .0129716 .8875373    .0117008 
Panel 2 .803966    .0143326 .8790965    .0130558 
Panel 3 .8051674    .0155383 .8853834    .0137433 
Panel 4 .7999936    .0148083 .8351319    .0145627 
Panel 5 .8105175    .0130569 .8454453     .012305 
Panel 6 .8225118    .0133963 .8980313    .0113594 
(*)Panel 1: Banks from all EU countries; Panel 2: Without France; Panel 3: Without Germany; Panel 4: Without Italy;  
Panel 5: Without UK; Panel 6: Without 5 EU countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain).  
 
The previous results are reinforced by the comparison of the values of the error term associated 
to inefficiency (σu ) and the random disturbances (σv)  that are presented in Table 5. In all situations 






Table 5 – Summary of the results obtained for the variance of the inefficient 
error term (σu ) and the noise (σv) 
 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 sigma_u2 sigma_v2 sigma_u2 sigma_v2 








Panel 1 .0949857    .0074096 .0215709    .0005829 .1928718    .0211833 .0244394    .0007063 
Panel 2 .0908196     .007486 .0221449    .0006284 .1808165    .0205855 .024868    .0007393 
Panel 3 .0823197    .0073811 .0199195     .000609 .1793802     .022376 .0232215    .0007507 
Panel 4 .0919917    .0077609 .0229988    .0006956 .1308513    .0124452        .0258321    .0008036 
Panel 5 .0903276    .0070008  .0211167    .0005887 .1290426    .0109571 .0235901    .0006718 
Panel 6 .1002227    .0083183     .0216269    .0006084    .2134477    .0246559   .0242363    .0007272 
(*)Panel 1: Banks from all EU countries; Panel 2: Without France; Panel 3: Without Germany; Panel 4: Without Italy;  
Panel 5: Without UK; Panel 6: Without 5 EU countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). 
 
Still according to the information presented in Table 5, in Model 1 the values of the variances of 
the inefficient error term are not higher than 0.1, while in Model 2 they range from 0.13 to 0.21 
confirming the positive influence on banks cost efficiency of the inclusion of the Non-Earning 
Assets in the outputs.  
Moreover, and confirming our previous conclusions, the exclusion of the banks from the 5 EU 
countries that had external financial assistance (our Panel 6)  reinforces the variance of the error 
mostly due to the inefficient term; on the other side, the exclusion of the Italian banks (Panel 4) 
is associated with lower contributions of the variance of the inefficient error terms to the total 
errors of the estimated bank cost efficiency functions. 
 
Summarising our results, Table 6 presents the different rankings of all considered panels in terms 
of the % of the total banks included in our sample, the % of the provided loans in 2017 and the 










Table 6 - Rankings of the considered panels 
 Ranking according 
to the % of the total 
banks in the sample 
Ranking according 
to the % of the 
provided loans in 
2017 
Ranking according 
to the values of the 
gamma – Model 1 
Ranking according 
to the values of the 
gamma – Model 2 
Panel 
1 
- - 3 2 
Panel 
2 
3 1 5 4 
Panel 
3 
2 4 4 3 
Panel 
4 
1 5 6 6 
Panel 
5 
4 2 2 5 
Panel 
6 
5 3 1 1 
(*)Panel 1: Banks from all EU countries; Panel 2: Without France; Panel 3: Without Germany; Panel 4: Without Italy;  
Panel 5: Without UK; Panel 6: Without 5 EU countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). 
 
 
Table 6 reveals that the Italian banks (not included in Panel 4) are the most numerous in our 
sample, although only in the 5th place in terms of the provided loans in 2017 and they look like 
the less efficient of our sample. 
On the other side, the most efficient banks are those not included in Panel 6, (the banks from the 
5 EU countries that had external financial assistance), although they are only in the 5th place in 
terms of the number banks included in our sample and in the 3rd place in terms of the provided 
loans in 2017. 
The French banks (not included in Panel 2) are in the 3rd place in terms of the number of banks 
but are those that lead the ranking of the provided loans in 2017. In terms of efficiency, their 
performance is not remarkable, particularly in our Model 1, where we consider three outputs. And 
in both models the French banks have a lower performance that the whole sample of banks 
considered in our estimations (included in Panel 1). The same happens with the German banks 
(not included in Panel 3) as they look like being less effective than the whole sample of banks, 
particularly in Model 1. Moreover, in our sample the number of the German banks is very relevant 




In what regards to the UK banks (excluded from Panel 5), they are not very numerous (4th place 
of the ranking) but they are relatively relevant in terms of the provided loans (2nd place of the 
ranking). In terms of efficiency, they have a much higher ranking in Model 1, revealing that 
contrary to the French and the German ones, the UK banks can be more efficient in comparison 
with all EU banks included in our sample, but only when we consider the model with three 
outputs. However, in Model 2, that is, when we consider only two outputs, the UK banks look 




5. Concluding Remarks  
In this paper we apply Stochastic Frontier Analysis techniques and use data sourced from the 
Moody’s Analytics BankFocus database for the period 2011-2017. Following the intermediation 
approach, we us, the available data and estimate a cost function considering the Total Cost more 
precisely, the sum of the interest expenses and the non-interest expenses) as the dependent 
variable.  
We consider two models: one with three outputs (Total Loans, Other Earning Assets and Non-
Earning Assets) and the second only with two outputs (not including the Non-Earning Assets). In 
both models we include two inputs (the price of the borrowed funds and the price of the physical 
capital and labour). In our estimations we also include four control variables: the ratio of Bank 
Equity to Total Assets, the ratio of Off-Balance Sheet Items to Total Assets, the ratio of Non-
Performing Loans to Gross Loans; and the ratio of Profit Before Tax to Average Assets.  
Adding to the existing literature on bank efficiency we specifically focus on the EU banking sector 
and answer to the questions addressed in this study: How efficient are the EU banks in the 
aftermath of the international crisis? How would the EU banks perform in the hypothetical 
scenarios of the Brexit and the exit of the banks of other specific EU countries? 
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The results obtained allow us to conclude that during the period 2011-2017, there is clear evidence 
of bank cost inefficiencies in the whole sample of 485 banks from all current 28 member-states 
(included in our Panel 1) as well as in all the considered sub-samples (Panels 2-6). And in all 
panels, inefficiency is higher when we only include two outputs in our estimations. 
We also consider the hypothetical scenarios of the Brexit and the exit of other three financially 
relevant EU countries: France, Germany and Italy, as well as the exit of the five countries that 
were deeply affected by the international financial and sovereign crisis (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain).  The results obtained point to the conclusion that the exit of the banks of 
these 5 EU countries from our sample would increase bank inefficiency while the exit of the 
Italian banks from our sample would clearly benefit bank efficiency. This means that in our 
sample the less efficient are the Italian banks and the most efficient are those banks belonging to 
the sub-sample of the five countries mostly affected by the crisis that requested international 
financial assistance. 
The relevance of the French and German banks is not totally balanced in our sample. The German 
banks are numerous but not particularly relevant in terms of the provided loans; on the other side, 
the French banks are less numerous than the German ones, but they are particularly relevant in 
terms of the provided loans. But in what regards to the efficiency performances, both the French 
and the German banks have lower performances than the whole sample of EU banks considered 
in our estimations.  
Regarding the UK banks included in our sample, they are not particularly numerous, but they are 
rather relevant in terms of the provided loans. The results about their cost efficiency are not 
unanimous in the two considered models. In model 2 (including only two outputs) the 
performance of the UK banks of our sample is still worse than the French and German ones. But 
if we include the three outputs (Total Loans, Other Earning Assets and Non-Earning Assets) the 
UK banks are more efficient than the whole sample of EU banks included in our sample. 
Summarising our results, we can say that despite the evident cost inefficiencies of the EU banks 
included in our samples, there are significant differences across countries. The Brexit, and the 
eventual exit of other relevant countries, would surely have consequences in terms of the bank 
18 
 
efficiencies. But at least in our sample, the exit of the French, German and particularly of the 
Italian banks could be beneficial to the overall bank efficiency.  On the other side, and still 
according to the results obtained with this sample of banks, the cost efficiency of the EU banks 
would decrease with the exit of the 5 member-states mostly affected with the crises that requested 
international financial assistance and were obliged to restructure their banking sectors.  
These results allow us to conclude that in terms of bank cost efficiency, particular attention should 
be paid not only to the UK banks, but also to the French and German ones, and very particularly, 
to the Italian banks. 
Further research in this field is still needed, namely considering other variables as bank outputs 
and/or inputs, using different kinds of efficiency estimates as well as other samples of EU and 
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Annex I – Number of banks by EU member-state and their representativeness 
 
EU country (*) Number of 
banks 
% of the total 
banks 
% of the provided loans in 
2017 
Austria 20 4.12 1.97 
Belgium 7 1.44 2.93 
Bulgaria 5 1.03 0.07 
Croatia 7 1.44 0.09 
Cyprus 3 0.62 0.08 
Czech Rep. 8 1.65 0.47 
Denmark 31 6.39 2.94 
Estonia 2 0.41 0.02 
Finland 5 1.03 0.54 
France 43 8.87 22.69 
Germany 103 21.24 10.17 
Greece 6 1.24 0.76 
Hungary 7 1.44 0.17 
Ireland 4 0.82 0.78 
Italy 105 21.65 8.96 
Latvia 1 0.21 0.02 
Lithuania 4 0.82 0.06 
Luxembourg 9 1.86 0.44 
Malta 3 0.62 0.04 
Netherlands 16 3.30 9.43 
Poland 14 2.89 0.98 
Portugal 6 1.24 0.98 
Romania 4 0.82 0.11 
Slovakia 7 1.44 0.12 
Slovenia 6 1.24 0.07 
Spain 13 2.68 8.95 
Sweden 7 1.44 3.98 
UK 39 8.04 22.16 
  




Annex II – Results obtained with panel stochastic frontier estimates 
 
 PANEL 1 PANEL 2 PANEL 3 PANEL 4 PANEL 5 PANEL 6 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Loans             
Coefficient .4666116 .5562018 .4680596 .5505037 .4458658           .5422244    .4532435        .5376321         .512265       .6011725        .4618813        .5444271    
z 56.43 58.03 54.56 58.35 51.26 55.59 46.81    55.61 54.70 64.13 53.97 55.20 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other Earning Assets             
Coefficient .2931024 .2884125 .2946971 .2856376 .3042175           .3013277    .3199344    .3247823        .2731249        .2747475        .293453        .2869654    
z 41.34 33.81 39.77 32.26 40.86 32.60 37.80 32.00 35.62 30.88 39.60 32.20 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Non-Earning Assets             
Coefficient .1245889  .122851  .141337            .1120953     .1129333         .1234898         
z 25.46  24.13  25.43  20.64  22.00  24.34  
P>|z| 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Price of borrowed 
funds 
            
Coefficient .2607996 .2261158 .2683168 .2333441 .2544262        .218669           .2692185        .2440644        .2587642        .2338356        .2594498    .227177     
z 52.47 44.21 50.92 42.91 48.89    40.10 45.17 38.89 51.90 44.77 50.14 43.09 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Price of capital and 
labour 
            
Coefficient .4766282 .4982678 .4726205 .4915696 .5324253    .5488856    .4686713        .4814794        .4621374        .4779544        .4709236    .4896846    
z 49.04 44.68 47.41 43.68 49.01 43.69    43.47 41.14 46.24 44.32 45.40 41.28 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Equity/Total Assets             
Coefficient -.1203645 -.1261133 -.1089643 -.113411 -.1216815    -.1312132    -.1037075         -.0948648        -.1418352       -.1355074      -.130107    -.1425518    
z -10.74 -10.87 -9.29 -9.21 -10.39 -10.50 -8.28 -6.99 -12.40 -10.97 -9.95 -10.67 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Off Balance Sheet 
Items/ Total Assets 
            
Coefficient -.015924 -.0196166 -.0194475 -.0230733 -.0103143           -.01555          -.0127145           -.0150176          -.0169593          -.0188142    -.0147164    -.0199891    
z -3.51 -3.97 -4.17 -4.58 -2.25 -3.06 -2.37 -2.61 -3.37 -3.48 -2.89 -3.61 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.002 0.018 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.000 
Non Perf. Loans / 
Gross Loans 
            
Coefficient .0200632 .0281281 .0205256 .028478 .0050243            .013664            .02825         .0353262         .025271         .0335416         .0193767    .0262413    
z 3.98 5.12 3.92 4.97 0.90 2.17 4.71 5.49 4.67 5.79 3.71 4.64 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.370 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit before 
tax/average assets 
            
Coefficient .0120258 .0111871 .0128904 .0124929 .0097104            .0109304         .0102243            .0112921            .0101162            .0099444    .0123533         .0121041     
25 
 
z 3.81 3.32 3.94 3.59 2.87 3.00    2.57 2.66 3.06 2.83 3.71 3.42 
P>|z| 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.001 
Constant             
Coefficient .8744746 1.609782 .834601 1.695644 1.063007            1.795898           3.898061            4.258934         3.612766         3.802109         .930888    1.704904    
z 1.60 14.28 0.96 14.27 1.42 14.44 0.92 0.84    0.59    0.59    2.28    14.25 
P>|z| 0.109 0.000 0.335 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.356 0.402 0.558 0.557 0.023 0.000 
             
mu              
Coefficient 1.301111 .734889 1.339288 .7984115 1.2525             .7738093    1.675875            1.981322         1.839847           2.006634    1.273452    .7554726         
z 2.42 9.08 1.56 10.71 1.69 10.49 0.40 0.39    0.30 0.31 3.23 9.52 
P>|z| 0.015 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.691 0.697 0.765 0.756 0.001 0.000 
             
gamma             
Coefficient .8149317 .8875373 .803966 .8790965 .8051674    .8853834    .7999936    .8351319    .8105175    .8454453     .8225118    .8980313    
Stand.error .0129716 .0117008 .0143326 .0130558 .0155383 .0137433 .0148083 .0145627 .0130569 .012305 .0133963 .0113594 
             
sigma_u2             
Coefficient .0949857 .1928718 .0908196 .1808165 .0823197    .1793802     .0919917    .1308513    .0903276    .1290426    .1002227    .2134477    
Stand.error .0074096 .0211833 .007486 .0205855 .0073811 .022376 .0077609 .0124452 .0070008 .0109571 .0083183 .0246559 
             
sigma_v2             
Coefficient .0215709 .0244394 .0221449 .024868 .0199195     .0232215    .0229988    .0258321    .0211167    .0235901    .0216269    .0242363    
Stand.error .0005829 .0007063 .0006284 .0007393 .000609 .0007507 .0006956 .0008036 .0005887 .0006718 .0006084 .0007272 
             
Wald chi2 22297.73 11051.20 19954.33 11079.59 21165.18 10338.49 19224.27 11995.73 22381.99 14604.68 18277.99 9305.80 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
             
Log likelihood 855.95628 565.70046 752.92722 489.94514 792.37426 507.45373 603.03076 404.99953 828.39965 601.70264 784.22061 520.50739 
N 3395 3395 3087 3087 2674 2674 2660 2660 3129 3129 3171 3171 
Dependent variable: Total cost 
 Panel 1: Banks from all EU countries; Panel 2: Without French banks; Panel 3: Without German banks; Panel 4: Without Italian banks; Panel 5: Without UK banks; 
Panel 6: Without the banks from 5 EU countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). 
 
 
